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IS IT TIME TO BURY BARRY? WHY AN OLD CHANGE
AT THE LEGISLATURE REQUIRES A NEW LOOK AT
WASHINGTON’S NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Daniel A. Himebaugh
Abstract: Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted a relaxed version of
the nondelegation doctrine in a case called Barry and Barry v. Department of Motor Vehicles.
The Barry rule, which only loosely restricts the delegation of policy-making power from the
Legislature to other bodies, is now widely applied in Washington State. However, the Barry
Court’s reasons for adjusting the nondelegation doctrine were based on an outdated
understanding of the Legislature, especially its regular session schedule. While the
Legislature’s regular sessions have changed since 1972—becoming longer and more frequent
due to constitutional amendment—the Court has not considered how these changes in
legislative operations may have undermined Barry’s lax approach to the delegation of
legislative authority. Washington courts should take a fresh look at the Barry rule in the light
of today’s legislative realities. A nondelegation doctrine that better aligns with the activities of
the modern Legislature would help preserve the separation of powers in Washington State.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay contends that the Supreme Court of Washington should
reassess its rationale for Washington’s version of the nondelegation
doctrine. A principle designed to safeguard the constitutional separation
of powers, the nondelegation doctrine prevents a legislature from
transferring to other branches of the government the legislature’s
exclusive “power to enact, suspend, and repeal laws.”1 In Washington, the
Court transformed the nondelegation doctrine in the 1972 case Barry and
Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, which loosened the rule
against delegating policymaking authority to non-legislative bodies.2
Barry partly rests on the notion that Washington’s legislature met too
infrequently to keep up with the changing needs of the public.3 When the
Court decided Barry, the legislature held a regular session on a biennial
basis.4 Noting that the legislature had an infrequent meeting schedule, the
Barry Court reasoned that permitting broad delegation of authority from
the legislature would help other actors within the government perform
tasks required of responsive policymakers.5 Perhaps this was a logical
position at the time, but Barry’s reasoning soon became obsolete after
Washington adopted its current pattern of holding a regular legislative
session every year.6 Therefore, the Barry decision is built upon an
outdated understanding of the legislature’s schedule—an anachronism the
Court has not addressed.
The Court’s failure to revisit Barry after all this time means that
Washington is still applying a permissive form of the nondelegation
doctrine developed to accommodate a version of Washington’s part-time
legislature that has been extinct for more than forty years. The Barry
framework has significant consequences for the separation of powers in
Washington.7 A permissive nondelegation doctrine allows the legislature
1. Gonzales v. Inslee, 21 Wash. App. 110, 130, 504 P.3d 890, 901 (2022) (quoting Diversified Inv.
P’ship v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wash. 2d 19, 24, 775 P.2d 947, 950 (1989)).
2. Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash. 2d 155, 159, 500 P.2d 540, 542–43
(1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1973). See Yakima Cnty. Clean Air Auth. v. Glascam
Builders, Inc., 85 Wash. 2d 255, 263, 534 P.2d 33, 37 (1975) (Finley, J., concurring) (describing
Barry as “mark[ing] a profound and significant change in legal philosophy with respect to the
delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies.”).
3. Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12; see S.J. Res. 110, 46th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1979) (codified
as amended at WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12).
7. See Davison v. State, 196 Wash. 2d 285, 294, 466 P.3d 231, 236 (2020) (“The Washington
Constitution divides our state government among three coequal branches: the legislative department,
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to avoid accountability by delivering its legislative power to other
branches of the government and allows non-legislative agencies to
exercise the lawmaking power without the backstop of elections and the
constitutionally prescribed legislative process.8
This Essay attempts to shed light on the logical underpinnings of
Washington’s nondelegation doctrine and encourages the Supreme Court
of Washington to rethink its approach. First, this Essay sets a foundation
by discussing the nondelegation doctrine’s relationship to the separation
of powers and the Barry Court’s understanding of the nondelegation
doctrine.9 The Essay also examines the facts of the Barry case and
summarizes the Court’s reasons for resetting the nondelegation doctrine.10
The Essay then highlights the Barry Court’s key assumption about the
legislature’s schedule that motivated the Court’s decision.11 Because that
assumption has become tenuous, the Essay argues that the Court should
reexamine its formulation of the nondelegation doctrine as established in
Barry.12 Finally, the Essay proposes that Barry’s weak nondelegation
doctrine is unnecessary in today’s legislative environment.13
I.

BARRY AND THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IN
WASHINGTON

The nondelegation doctrine stems from the foundational principle of
the separation of powers. This Part remarks on the relationship between
those concepts and then examines how the Supreme Court of Washington
altered the nondelegation doctrine in Barry.

the executive, and the judiciary.”); Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wash. 2d 879, 892, 467 P.3d 953, 961 (2020)
(“The fundamental functions of each branch are familiar to most Washingtonians. The legislative
branch writes laws . . . the executive branch faithfully executes those laws . . . and ‘[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
8. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., __ U.S.
__, 142 S. Ct. 661, 669 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “The nondelegation doctrine ensures
democratic accountability by preventing Congress from intentionally delegating its legislative powers
to unelected officials. Sometimes lawmakers may be tempted to delegate power to agencies to
‘reduc[e] the degree to which they will be held accountable for unpopular actions.’ But the
Constitution imposes some boundaries here.” Id. (quoting Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered:
A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 147, 154
(2017)).
9. See infra Part I.A–B.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
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Separation of Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine

The separation of powers among the three branches of government is
“one of the cardinal and fundamental principles of the American
constitutional system, both state and federal.”14 It “ensure[s] that the
fundamental functions of each coordinate branch of government remain
inviolate,” including the “fundamental function of the legislature . . . ’to
set policy and to draft and enact laws.’”15 The separation of powers
prevents the concentration of the different types of governmental power
in a single, all-powerful branch of the government—thereby preserving
the people’s liberty against the threat of tyranny.16
In Washington, the state constitution vests the legislative power in the
state legislature, which consists of the Senate and House of
Representatives.17 Through this constitutional prescription, the people of
Washington placed the lawmaking power exclusively in the hands of
legislators.18
The nondelegation doctrine is intended to protect the people’s
placement of the legislative power in two ways. First, it restrains a
legislature “from transferring its power to another branch of
[g]overnment.”19 Second, the doctrine restricts non-legislative branches
14. Wash. State Legislature v. Inslee, 198 Wash. 2d 561, 567, 498 P.3d 496, 502 (2021) (quoting
Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers Ass’n v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 667, 674, 763 P.2d 442, 446 (1988)).
15. Wash. State Legislature, 198 Wash. 2d at 579, 498 P.3d at 508 (quoting Hale v. Wellpinit Sch.
Dist. No. 49, 165 Wash. 2d 494, 506, 198 P.3d 1021, 1026 (2009); Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d
129, 135, 882 P.2d 173, 177 (1994)).
16. See Collins v. Yellen, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1780 (2021); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1969) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”).
17. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested
in the legislature, consisting of a senate and house of representatives, which shall be called the
legislature of the state of Washington, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills,
laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature, and also reserve
power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any bill,
act, or law passed by the legislature.”).
18. Washington’s constitution reserves the powers of initiative and referendum to the people.
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. The reservation of certain lawmaking powers is an important component
of Washington’s system of government, but it is not material to the analysis presented in this Essay.
19. Gundy v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (“The nondelegation doctrine
bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another branch of Government.”) (plurality
opinion); State v. Batson, 196 Wash. 2d 670, 674, 478 P.3d 75, 77 (2020) (“‘[I]t is unconstitutional
for the Legislature to abdicate or transfer its legislative function to others.’”) (quoting Brower v. State,
137 Wash. 2d 44, 54, 969 P.2d 42, 49 (1998)); Gonzales v. Inslee, 21 Wash. App. 110, 130, 504 P.3d
890, 901 (2022) (“[T]he legislature cannot delegate purely legislative functions to other branches of
government.”) (citing Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, 183 Wash. 2d 842, 859, 357 P.3d 615, 623
(2015)); Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. State, 19 Wash. App. 99, 108, 494 P.3d 443, 448
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from legislating, recognizing that the legislature is the only branch that
may make laws.20 Without such constraints, courts and scholars observe
that an overzealous legislature might destroy the people’s design for their
government through the act of delegating power to others.21 Nevertheless,
the legislature commonly delegates authority to other entities, such as
executive branch agencies or even nongovernmental organizations.22
B.

The Barry Decision

The nondelegation doctrine should give life to the separation of powers,
but Washington courts shifted in their application of the doctrine in
Barry.23 Prior to Barry, Washington’s approach to the nondelegation
doctrine was more restrictive, requiring “specific legislative standards”
for the delegation of power by the legislature to other entities.24 The
Supreme Court of Washington significantly relaxed this formulation by
announcing in Barry that “the requirement of specific legislative
standards for the delegation of legislative power is excessively harsh and
needlessly difficult to fulfill.”25
Barry scrutinized a state Department of Motor Vehicles rule that
capped the fees employment agencies could charge their clients.26 The
plaintiff employment agencies and counselors in those agencies brought

(2021) (quoting Batson, 196 Wash. 2d at 674, 478 P.3d at 77), rev. granted sub nom. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Wash. v. Inslee, 198 Wash. 2d 1032, 501 P.3d 145 (2022); see State v. Dougall, 89
Wash. 2d 118, 122–23, 570 P.2d 135, 138 (1977) (“While the legislature may enact statutes which
adopt existing federal rules, regulations, or statutes, legislation which attempts to adopt or acquiesce
in future federal rules, regulations, or statutes is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
and thus void.”) (emphasis in original).
20. Gonzales, 21 Wash. App. at 130, 504 P.3d at 901.
21. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133–34 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Professor Hamburger identifies the
people’s establishment of their government as the original delegation of authority and labels as
“subdelegation” the further transfer of power from the legislature to executive branch agencies. PHILIP
HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377–402 (2014). “Delegation was the principle
by which the people established their republic and kept their power superior to that of their
government, including its legislature.” Id. at 380.
22. Evidence of this phenomenon is easy to find in the 227 titles that comprise the Washington
Administrative Code, the collection of rules adopted by non-legislative agencies, where unelected
officials charged by the legislature to regulate the public create state policy. WASH. ADMIN. CODE
(2022), apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/. See United Chiropractors of Wash. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 578 P.2d
38, 40 (1978) (“Delegation to a private organization raises concerns not present in the ordinary
delegation of authority to a governmental administrative agency.”).
23. Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash. 2d 155, 159, 500 P.2d 540, 542
(1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1973).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 156, 500 P.2d at 541.
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suit to block the Department from implementing the fee cap.27 They
claimed that the controlling statute unconstitutionally delegated authority
to the Department because the legislature did not provide appropriate
legislative standards to limit the Department’s discretion over the fee
schedule.28 The statute contained two brief but broad provisions that
required employment agencies to obtain the Department director’s
approval for the use of a contract or fee schedule, and only required the
director to issue “reasonable rules” for the program “from time to time.”29
The Court sided with the Department and upheld the statute that
authorized the Department’s fee-setting authority.30 The Court concluded
that the statute’s delegation provisions constitutionally authorized the
Department to cap employment agency fees at the Department director’s
determined amounts.31
In stark contrast to the old requirement of “specific legislative
standards,” neither statutory provision established meaningful standards,
guidelines, or a range of permissible fees for the Department to impose.32
The Court recited precedent that had previously upheld delegations of
“administrative power” to different entities under a rule requiring
“reasonable administrative standards.”33 It also reiterated that its earlier
opinions had emphasized that the legislature “cannot delegate its power
to make a law.”34 However, the Court concluded that to require an exact
standard would have been unnecessary because Washington’s
nondelegation doctrine should not demand that the legislature provide
“specific or precise standards” when assigning a policymaking task, such
as the creation of a fee schedule, to the Department.35
The Court based its new broad approach to delegation on three
justifications.36 Of primary importance for this Essay, the Court reasoned
that a part-time legislature simply did not have sufficient policymaking
capacity.37 When the Court decided Barry, the Washington legislature

27. Id. at 157, 500 P.2d at 542.
28. Id. at 158, 500 P.2d at 542.
29. Id. at 157–58, 500 P.2d at 542.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 158, 500 P.2d at 542.
32. Id. at 159, 500 P.2d at 542.
33. Id. at 158, 500 P.2d at 542 (quoting Keeting v. Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 49 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 306
P.2d 762, 766 (1957)).
34. Id. at 159, 500 P.2d at 542 (quoting Carstens v. De Sellem, 82 Wash. 643, 650, 144 P. 934, 937
(1914)).
35. Id. at 163, 500 P.2d at 545 (emphasis omitted).
36. Id. at 159–61, 500 P.2d at 543.
37. Id. at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
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only met in regular session for sixty days every two years.38 The Court
worried that the legislature would not have the opportunity to adopt
standards “and then alter [them] periodically to meet the changing needs
of . . . the public.”39 In addition, the Court opined that the “efficient
operation” of government would be frustrated if it was prevented from
deciding policies on a case-by-case basis at an administrative level, and
that the needs of modern government required the delegation of legislative
power “without specific guiding standards.”40
To reach its conclusion that the fee statute was constitutional, the Barry
Court had to redefine its approach to the nondelegation doctrine. The
Court reformulated the nondelegation doctrine with a new two-prong test
that it would thereafter use to determine when the delegation of
“legislative power” to non-legislative agencies is appropriate.41 As
devised by the Court, the first prong of the Barry test asks whether “the
legislature has provided standards or guidelines which define in general
terms what is to be done and the instrumentality or administrative body
which is to accomplish it.”42 The second prong asks whether “procedural
safeguards exist to control arbitrary administrative action and any
administrative abuse of discretionary power.”43
Barry created a permissive nondelegation doctrine for Washington.
Now, Barry has become a well-worn feature of Washington law.44 It often
38. See id. The original constitutional text read as follows: “The first legislature shall meet on the
first Wednesday after the first Monday in November, A. D., 1889. The second legislature shall meet
on the first Wednesday after the first Monday in January, A. D., 1891, and sessions of the legislature
shall be held biennially thereafter, unless specially convened by the governor, but the times of meeting
of subsequent sessions may be changed by the legislature. After the first legislature the sessions shall
not be more than sixty days.” WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12 (1889).
39. Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
40. Id. at 159–60, 500 P.2d at 543 (emphasis omitted).
41. Id. at 159, 500 P.2d at 542–43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 159, 500 P.2d at 543 (emphasis omitted); see State v. Simmons, 152 Wash. 2d 450, 455,
98 P.3d 789, 791 (2004).
44. See, e.g., Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, 183 Wash. 2d 842, 357 P.3d 615 (2015); Chi. Title
Ins. Co. v. Wash. State Off. of Ins. Comm’r, 178 Wash. 2d 120, 309 P.3d 372 (2013); Brown v. Vail,
169 Wash. 2d 318, 237 P.3d 263 (2010); Pierce Cnty. v. State, 159 Wash. 2d 16, 148 P.3d 1002
(2006); Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wash. 2d 752, 131 P.3d 892 (2006); Simmons,
152 Wash. 2d at 450, 98 P.3d at 789; State ex rel. Peninsula Neighborhood Ass’n v. Wash. State Dep’t
of Transp., 142 Wash. 2d 328, 12 P.3d 134 (2000); McGee Guest Home, Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs., 142 Wash. 2d 316, 12 P.3d 144 (2000); King Cnty. v. Taxpayers of King Cnty., 133
Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997); Mun. of Metro. Seattle v. Div. 587, Amalgamated Transit
Union, 118 Wash. 2d 639, 826 P.2d 167 (1992); Mun. of Metro. Seattle v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Comm’n,
118 Wash. 2d 621, 826 P.2d 158 (1992); Diversified Inv. P’ship v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.,
113 Wash. 2d 19, 775 P.2d 947 (1989); Asarco, Inc. v. Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency,
112 Wash. 2d 314, 771 P.2d 335 (1989); Mahoney v. Shinpoch, 107 Wash. 2d 679, 732 P.2d 510
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reappears when Washington’s nondelegation doctrine is applied in cases
that involve questions about the proper exercise of authority for a given
public policy.45 Under Barry, Washington courts do not stop the
legislature from giving policymaking authority to another entity if the
legislature generally determines who gets it, what they may do with it,
and that it is not subject to abuse.46 In the words of Justice Finley, who
authored the Barry opinion, this reimagining of the nondelegation
doctrine “marked a profound and significant change in legal philosophy
with respect to the delegation of legislative power to administrative
agencies.”47
Fifty years after Barry, Washington remains among states where a
“weak” version of the nondelegation doctrine prevails.48 According to
(1987); Hi-Starr, Inc. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 106 Wash. 2d 455, 722 P.2d 808 (1986);
Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash. 2d 861, 665 P.2d 1328 (1983); State v. Holmes,
98 Wash. 2d 590, 657 P.2d 770 (1983); Nw. Gillnetters Ass’n v. Sandison, 95 Wash. 2d 638, 628
P.2d 800 (1981); State v. Ermert, 94 Wash. 2d 839, 621 P.2d 121 (1980); State v. Bryan, 93 Wash.
2d 177, 606 P.2d 1228 (1980); State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 92 Wash. 2d 894, 602 P.2d 1172
(1979); In re Powell, 92 Wash. 2d 882, 602 P.2d 711 (1979); McDonald v. Hogness, 92 Wash. 2d
431, 598 P.2d 707 (1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Sw. Air Pollution Control Auth., 91 Wash. 2d 77,
586 P.2d 1163 (1978); Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978);
United Chiropractors of Wash., Inc. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 1, 578 P.2d 38 (1978); State ex rel. Pub.
Disclosure Comm’n v. Rains, 87 Wash. 2d 626, 555 P.2d 1368 (1976); Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86
Wash. 2d 698, 548 P.2d 320 (1976); Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash. 2d 441,
536 P.2d 157 (1975); Yakima Cnty. Clean Air Auth. v. Glascam Builders, Inc., 85 Wash. 2d 255, 534
P.2d 33 (1975); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974); Wash. State Sch. Dirs. Ass’n
v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 82 Wash. 2d 367, 510 P.2d 818 (1973); State ex rel. Standard Mining &
Dev. Corp. v. City of Auburn, 82 Wash. 2d 321, 510 P.2d 647 (1973).
45. Recent cases featuring Barry include lawsuits about the authority to set prevailing wages for
employees on public works projects, electric rates for cryptocurrency mining, and even the state’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Slidewaters LLC v. Wash. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 4 F.4th
747, 756 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Barry for the proposition that “[t]he delegation of power by the
legislature to the executive to act in a time of emergency under the standards set out by the legislature
and using the procedures dictated by the legislature does not present separation of powers concerns.”);
Blocktree Props., LLC v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant Cnty., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1116 (E.D.
Wash. 2019); Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. State, 19 Wash. App. 2d 99, 108, 494 P.3d
443, 448 (2021), rev. granted sub nom. Associated Gen. Contractors of Wash. v. Inslee, 198 Wash.
2d 1032, 501 P.3d 145 (2022).
46. See Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 159, 500 P.2d at 542–43; City of Auburn v. King Cnty., 114 Wash.
2d 447, 452, 788 P.2d 534, 537 (1990) (“Administrative procedures tending to discourage arbitrary
action provide adequate safeguards when combined with limited judicial review.”); see also Blocktree
Props., LLC, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 1116 (finding that judicial review and public comment may provide
sufficient procedural safeguards against the abuse of discretion to satisfy Barry).
47. Yakima Cnty. Clean Air Auth., 85 Wash. 2d at 263, 534 P.2d 33 at 37 (Finley, J., concurring).
48. Joseph Postell, The Myth of the State Nondelegation Doctrines 45–46 (The C. Boyden Gray
Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State, Antonin Scalia L. Sch., Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper
21–30, 2021), https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2021/07/Postell-TheMyth-of-the-State-Nondelegation-Doctrines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74MK-M8LC]
(classifying
Washington as a “weak” state for the nondelegation doctrine); see Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and
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recent scholarship, Washington is one of the states where the
nondelegation doctrine has not been applied to invalidate a statute since
1980.49
Yet Barry’s logic applied to a legislature that kept a different calendar
than the one that is used today.50 As previously mentioned, the state
constitution originally established a sixty-day, biennial, regular legislative
session.51 Washingtonians later amended their constitution to augment the
legislature’s schedule.52 In 1979—seven years after Barry—Washington
voters passed the 68th Amendment, which requires the legislature to meet
more often and for longer periods.53 Since then, the legislature has met for
a 105-day regular session in odd-numbered years and a sixty-day regular
session in even-numbered years.54 The next Part of the Essay explains
why this change in the legislature’s schedule means Barry has become
untethered from the practical operations of the Washington legislature.
II.

BARRY AND TODAY’S LEGISLATURE

This Part examines whether Barry’s reasons for reformulating the
nondelegation doctrine in Washington make sense today. We must first
identify how the Barry Court’s assumption about the old legislative
calendar influenced the Court’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine.55
Then, this Part will explore how the other bases for the Barry decision fall
away when the central misconception about legislative capacity is

the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1167, 1191–92 (1999) (classifying Washington as a “‘weak’ nondelegation” state); Gary J. Greco,
Survey, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 567, 598–99 (1994) (classifying Washington as among the states with the most lenient
nondelegation doctrines, where most legislative delegations of power to administrative agencies are
upheld); Tim J. Filer, The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions in Washington Revisited –
Doctrine, Analysis, and Proposed Revisions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 653, 653 (1985) (“[T]he Washington
Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution to allow broad delegations of legislative power
to administrative agencies.”).
49. Postell, supra note 48, at 45–46. In the category of weak nondelegation states, Postell lists
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id.
50. See Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 542–43.
51. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
52. S.J. Res. 110, 46th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1979) (codified as amended at WASH. CONST.
art. II, § 12).
53. Id.
54. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12.
55. See infra Part II.A.
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addressed.56
Before looking at those specific issues, it must be noted that the Barry
Court did not thoroughly grapple with the important separation of powers
problem that loomed over the case, that is, whether assigning to an
unelected official the unlimited power to set fees for an entire industry
undermined the legislature’s accountability for the decisions the official
would make.57 However, even without squarely confronting that basic and
important question, the Court’s endorsement of a permissive version of
the nondelegation doctrine loses some force when the legislature has the
ability to take an active role in the policymaking process.58
A.

Barry’s Outdated Judgment About the Legislature’s Capacity

Although the state constitution vests the legislative power in the
legislature, the Barry rule allows the legislature to assign policymaking
responsibility to other bodies “unfettered by any so-called legislative
standards.”59 Barry assumed that, because of the legislature’s original
infrequent meeting schedule, it was necessary for the legislature to
delegate policymaking authority to the agencies that administer
government programs on a full-time basis.60
In particular, the Barry Court posited that when “the legislature meets
only biennially,” it will lack opportunities to alter policies “to meet the
changing needs of . . . the public as revealed by administrative
experience.”61 The legislature’s original calendar convinced the Court that
the legislature could not keep up with “various economic factors” that
would “affect any meticulously prescribed legislative standards” adopted
on a biennial basis.62 Thus, the Barry Court’s specific concern about an
absent legislature appears to have driven the Court to relax the
nondelegation doctrine in Washington.63
But the Barry Court’s doubts about the legislature’s ability to engage
in policymaking are not well-founded today. With the passage of the
68th Amendment, the modern legislature meets in regular session more
56. See infra Part II.B.
57. See Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash. 2d 155, 162, 500 P.2d 540, 544
(1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1973) (construing the state and federal constitutions to “mean
only that legislative power is delegated initially and fundamentally to the legislative bodies.”)
(emphasis in original).
58. See id. at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
59. Id. at 158, 500 P.2d at 542.
60. Id. at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

Himebaugh (Do Not Delete)

2022]

9/23/2022 10:39 AM

IS IT TIME TO BURY BARRY?

61

often and for far longer periods.64 Moreover, the legislature employs
numerous full-time lawyers and other professionals with expertise in all
areas of public policy.65 And the legislature can call itself into session if
quick action on an emerging issue of public concern becomes necessary.66
In short, the Barry Court based its decision to modify the traditional
nondelegation doctrine on an assumption about legislative incapacity that
may have seemed persuasive in 1972, but which does not fit with the
legislature’s current calendar or capabilities.67
It is also important to highlight that today’s Washington state
legislators are not strictly part-time public servants. Their jobs do not stop
when sessions end.68 According to a recent survey from the National
Conference of State Legislatures, Washington legislators typically spend
more than two-thirds of a full-time job on legislative duties.69 Legislators
are serving on an almost-career basis even though Washington officially
has a part-time legislature.70 Indeed, “part-time” is a misleading label for
Washington’s legislature because legislators serve their constituents
throughout the year; they are merely barred from taking any official action
on legislation when they are not assembled in session.71 Washington’s
legislature has proven to be a more active policymaking body in the years
since Barry.
64. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12.
65. The Washington State Legislature is served by a full-time professional nonpartisan staff called
the Office of Program Research and Senate Committee Services. WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE,
OFFICE
OF
PROGRAM
RESEARCH,
https://leg.wa.gov/house/opr/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VWV8-8NJX]; WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, SENATE COMMITTEE SERVICES,
https://leg.wa.gov/SENATE/COMMITTEES/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/CM38-YVDA].
Additionally, each caucus of the House and Senate employs its own full-time staff of lawyers and
analysts. WASH. STATE HOUSE DEMOCRATS, https://housedemocrats.wa.gov [https://perma.cc/93RPSTZW];
WASH.
STATE
HOUSE
REPUBLICANS,
https://houserepublicans.wa.gov
[https://perma.cc/B45X-SKCH];
WASH.
SENATE
DEMOCRATS,
SDC
STAFF,
https://senatedemocrats.wa.gov/sdc-staff/ [https://perma.cc/KC4K-Y76M]; WASH. STATE SENATE
REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, https://src.wastateleg.org [https://perma.cc/MMA6-2KDQ].
66. The legislature did not attain the ability to convene a special session without the governor’s
approval until after the passage of Amendment 62 in 1974. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12; S.J. Res. 140,
43d Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 1974) (codified as amended at WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12); see also
Act of Mar. 24, 2022, ch. 150, 2022 Wash. Sess. Laws 852 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 44.04)
(codifying a process for convening legislatively initiated special sessions).
67. See Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
68. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12; WASH. REV. CODE § 44.04.010 (2021).
69. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Full- and Part-Time Legislatures (July 28, 2021)
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Z7WR-G4N9].
70. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12.
71. See, e.g., Permanent Rules of the Senate, S. Res. 8600, 8631, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5 (Wash.
2022) https://leg.wa.gov/Senate/Administration/pages/senate_rules.aspx [https://perma.cc/SYH4PBMY] (“[N]o executive action on bills may be taken during an interim.”).
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Barry’s statements about the legislature’s limited capacity have not
withstood the test of time. And yet, Washington’s lenient nondelegation
doctrine remains anchored to judicial presuppositions about a legislative
schedule that fell into disuse more than forty years ago.72 The Court would
do well to consider whether its framing of the nondelegation doctrine
remains persuasive where the legislature’s practices have changed and the
Court’s seminal precedent inaccurately depicts the legislature’s activities.
B.

Legislative Session Frequency and Barry’s Other Propositions

When the Barry Court changed the course of Washington’s
nondelegation doctrine, it cited two additional reasons, apart from its
concerns with the legislature’s schedule, to embrace a new understanding
of the doctrine.73 First, the Court opined that a lenient nondelegation
doctrine would enhance the efficiency of government.74 Second, and
related to the first reason, the Court determined that a modern government
requires delegation of legislative power without specific guiding
standards.75
In Barry, this meant that the Court believed the Department director
was better suited than the legislature to make decisions about the
appropriate amount of fees employment agencies should be allowed to
charge.76 The Court further submitted that any specific standards the
legislature might set to guide the director’s fee-setting decisions would
only amount to “vague verbalisms.”77 The following sections highlight
that, because the 68th Amendment solved the “absent legislature
problem” postulated in Barry, it also undercut the efficiency and standardsetting theories that supported the Court’s seismic shift in how it would
apply the nondelegation doctrine in Washington.78
1.

Government Efficiency

At the heart of Barry’s skepticism about the legislature is the concern
that the legislature would be unable to “alter” or “attune[]” policy
decisions in the light of new information, perhaps paralyzing government
and making it less efficient.79 However, a legislature that meets regularly
72. Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
73. Id. at 159–61, 500 P.2d at 542–44.
74. Id. at 159–60, 500 P.2d at 542–43.
75. Id. at 160, 500 P.2d at 543 (emphasis in original).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
78. Id. at 159–61, 500 P.2d at 542–44.
79. See id. at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
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for a sufficient period, and which may reassemble at any time, can make
finely tuned policy judgments, just as a hypothetical bureaucrat might do
in Barry’s vision of government.80 The essential difference is that, unlike
a bureaucrat, a legislator who fulfills their policymaking role is behaving
in accordance with the separation of powers and is directly accountable to
the electorate for the decisions the legislator makes.
The example of fees is illustrative because technical fee-setting
authority was at the center of Barry.81 The legislature has, since Barry,
repeatedly set and reset various fees through legislation. In fact, during
the legislature’s 2021 regular session alone, the legislature modified the
dollar amounts of fees for such diverse subjects as pesticides, fertilizer,
drivers’ licenses, college courses, drug take-back programs, and whale
watching.82 Through actions like this, the legislature demonstrates that it
has the faculties to make detailed adjustments to the programs it creates.
With respect to Barry’s concerns about legislative capacity, we might
ask whether a legislature that rarely meets and which cannot reconvene
at-will lacks flexibility at the expense of government efficiency. It might,
at least in comparison to a legislature that meets more often. But the
impulse to allow for broad delegation of legislative authority to nonlegislative actors in the name of preserving government efficiency should
be resisted when, invoking the Barry Court’s own standard, the legislature
does have “the opportunity to adopt a [policy] and then alter it periodically
to meet the changing needs” of the public, as Washington’s legislature
does.83
2.

Legislative Standards
In addition to addressing efficiency concerns, an active legislature is

80. Two provisions of the Washington Constitution establish the legislature’s authority to initiate
a special session upon a two-thirds vote. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12; art. III, § 12. Special sessions
have typically been initiated by the governor through the mechanism of a proclamation under
article III, section 7, often with agreement or acquiescence from the legislature. WASH. CONST.
art. III, § 7. See, e.g., Proclamation by the Governor 17-10 (June 21, 2017),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/17-10SpecialSession.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TZE5-CDGW].
81. Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 156–57, 500 P.2d at 541–42.
82. Act of May 10, 2021, ch. 244, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1918 (codified as amended at WASH.
REV. CODE § 15.58, § 17.21); Act of May 12, 2021, ch. 282, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 2250 (codified
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 15.54); Act of May 3, 2021, ch. 158, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 913
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20); Act of April 16, 2021, ch. 71, 2021 Wash. Sess.
Laws 442 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 28A, § 28B); Act of May 3, 2021, ch. 155,
2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 888 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.48, § 43.131); Act of
May 12, 2021, ch. 284, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 2259 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE § 77.65.615).
83. Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 543.
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capable of successfully marking out boundaries for a non-legislative
actor’s exercise of discretion. A legislature that meets regularly will have
the opportunity to set with specificity and revisit the statutory instructions
it provides to officials who carry out its policies.
In Barry, the Court fixated on the risk that the legislature would only
lay out meaningless standards.84 It is true that the open-ended statute
under review in Barry did not expressly allow the director to cap
employment agency fees.85 However, that statute does not prove that the
legislature is incapable of developing specific criteria that apply to the
exercise of an official’s discretion. It only shows that in the one particular
case of the employment agency law in Barry the legislature failed to do
so.86
In truth, the legislature that drafted the Barry statute had many options
at its disposal to provide specific fee-setting criteria to the agency. Some
choices include setting the dollar amount of the fees in the statute,
instructing the director to set fees but capping them at a certain amount,
creating a fee range with a minimum and maximum permissible fee based
on objective criteria, or requiring the director to set fees at an amount that
would meet a specific goal. While some of these options would have
cabined the discretion of the director more than others, none of them can
fairly be called “vague,” “unsound,” or “legally meaningless” in the
language of the Barry decision.87 All of the alternative options would
represent “specific or precise” instructions to the official who administers
the program, in contrast to the capacious standard the Court upheld in
Barry.88
Like the concern about government efficiency, any doubts about the
legislature’s ability to provide specific standards for the exercise of law
enforcement officials’ discretion should be assuaged if the legislature can
regularly meet to examine, reexamine, and refine its approach. Does this
mean that a legislature meeting on a consistent basis will always provide
precise standards for the exercise of administrative authority? No. But it
does mean that a court should have high expectations for the legislature
to carefully prescribe how a non-legislative official may exercise the
power to make policy.89
84. Id. at 160–61, 500 P.2d at 543.
85. Id. at 156–57, 500 P.2d at 541.
86. Id. at 157–58, 500 P.2d at 541–42.
87. Id. at 160–61, 500 P.2d at 543.
88. Id. at 163, 500 P.2d at 545 (emphasis omitted).
89. See generally State v. Coria, 146 Wash. 2d 631, 651–52, 48 P.3d 980, 990 (2004) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting) (“The pressure on legislatures to discharge their responsibility with care, understanding
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Concerns about a legislature’s ability to legislate with precision do not
justify weakening the nondelegation doctrine. Quite the opposite. Courts
that are concerned about legislatures delegating their legislative authority
to non-legislative decisionmakers should energetically enforce a strong
nondelegation doctrine and require specific standards, set by the
legislature, to ensure that legislatures are fulfilling their lawmaking role
under the separation of powers.90
CONCLUSION
The Court’s reliance on Barry to set the contours of Washington’s
nondelegation doctrine warrants reconsideration because it is largely
based on an outdated understanding of the state legislature.91 The Barry
Court eschewed a rule that required specific or precise legislative
standards for the delegation of policymaking authority in part because it
presumed that state government could not function under such a rule,
given the legislature’s original regular session schedule.92 But the Barry
Court’s presumption has been on weak footing for more than forty years,
since the people of Washington amended their constitution to require the
legislature to meet on a more frequent basis.93 Today’s legislature does
not represent the impediment to policymaking that the Barry Court
characterized in 1972.94 The Supreme Court of Washington should
examine whether its reasons for weakening the nondelegation doctrine in
Barry still hold sway in a system of government where the legislature
must meet annually and may reconvene of its own accord.

and imagination should be stiffened, not relaxed. Above all, they must not be encouraged in
irresponsible or undisciplined use of language.”) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 545–46 (1947)).
90. See supra Part I.A.
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 541.
93. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 12.
94. See Barry, 81 Wash. 2d at 160, 500 P.2d at 541.

